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I am partic~larly honored /4o have the opportunity to address 
you ladies and gentlemen of the Hardwood Plywood Instituteh or a 
number of reasons. 
First, I have attended your annual banquets for the past few 
year~nd I have always been impressed by your selection of speakers. 
Those I have heard/4ave been dedicated to the preservation of our 
free enterprise system/against the insidious forces of collectivism. 
I may not have much else in common with your preii.ous speakers, 
but I do share their concernA or the grave threat which creeping 
collectivism pose:/to our freedom of initiative and our individual 
liberties. As a member of the United States Senate, I shall 
continue to fight these forces/which are bent on throwing our 
people into the socialist and communist slave camp through the 
internal erosion of our government nd, ultimately, the destruction 
of our liberties. 
Second,:. I realize full well the importance of our hardwood 
plywood industryfio my State of South Carolina, our national 
economy, and our defense program. I shall not stand idly by/while 
the State Department offers up this vital industry/ as a sacrifice 
on the altar of foreign policy/by maladministration of the so-called 
reciprocal trade program. 
There can be nothing reciprocal about the administration of 
a program/ which permits more than 50 per cent of OU" domestic 
plywood markets/ to be taken over by foreign low-wage competitors. 
The free-trade program/was never intended to be used as an 
instrument of foreign policy. Furthermore, ..the father of the 
Trade Act, Cordell Hull, and all Administrations which have been 
responsible for our trade programftiave contended that it should 
not cause harm to any domestic industry. 
I am presently working on legislation/ that will carry out 
the original intention of the Trade Actfaithout· the opportunity 
for maladministration. In the meantime, I hope that several of the 
recommendations o-f our Special Textile Subcommittee/of the 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee ill have some helpful 
. 
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effects on your case/ now pending before the Tariff Commission. In 
our report, which was unanimously approved by the full committee, 
we recommended import quotas, more realistic interpretatm n 
of the peril-point provision of the Trade Act, and faster action 
on escape-clause cases brought before the Tariff Commission. 
After reading your brief which was submitted to the Commission, 
I feel you have set out an excellent case for relief/4nder the 
escape clause provision of the Trade Act. If you should be 
forced to come to the Congress/because of unfavorable action by 
the Administration, I shall exert every effort to assist you/ in 
seeking a reversal of the action of the President. The provision 
which provides for the appeal to the Congress/i s not realistic. 
The Congress should have approved, in the 1958 Trade Extension 
Act, the Kerr-Thurmond amendment which was added to the bill by 
the Senate Finance Committee. Our amendment would have placed 
the burden of appealing to the Congress/4n the President, instead 
of an industry /such as hardwood plywood, which does not possess 
the power or influence of the Presidentfin legislative matters. 
At this point I wish to express my appreciation to Mr. Bob 
Hawes and Mr. Bob ~fior the assistance and support they 
have given me) in my efforts to get relief, or some means of 
obtaining relief, for the plywood industry. They were particularly 
helpful/on the Kerr-Thurmond amendment. There is another 
gentleman in your industry who deserves much praise for his diligent 
efforts A.n behalf of our amendment. Mr. Walter St,illey of 
Conway, South Carolina, endangered his health to come to Washington, 
and appeared with me before the Finance Committee, in order to 
help us win in the Finance Committee/4y a vote of 8-7. 
I shall not dwell further/ on the problems of your industry. 
I.2..u know them/ far better than I. 
There are two things which I would like to briefly discuss 
with you this afternoon. They are National Defense and our 
Federal fiscal policy. Each is, of course, affected by the other, 
and both are crucial in our struggle for survival. Let me say 
initially, that a strong National Defense and a sound fiscal 
policy,/4.re not inconsistent, nor are they alternative choices. 
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I do not believe that there is anyone, either in the Congress, 
the Administration or in the military establishment, who does not 
agree / that we should maintain an adequate defense force. It is 
the question of what constitutes an adequate defense/on which 
-opinions vary. I use the term "vary" advisedly, rather than the 
term "differ", for I am convinced that whatever conflict of 
opinion exists, is one only of degree. 
T~e questions which perplex those responsible for defense 
needs, and indeed, all Americans, are of magnified perplexity / 
because of the consciousness of the very life and death struggle 
which hangs on the outcome of our decisi~mso Whatever complacency 
may have existed;'s to the communists' aims for world conquest and 
dominatmnpiave, or certainly should have, been dispelled/ in the 
minds of objective appraisers by the reprehensible conduct of 
communist nations in the past decade. For every promise which 
they make, there are two threats; for every agreement, without 
exception, there is a breacho Whatever may be our variations of 
opinions as to the oppositions' strength, no one will deny that 
it is more than sufficie1nt ,k, o pose an immediate and ever-present 
threat to our continued existence. 
In seeking to reach a proper balance of our defense 
structure, we realize the necessity of providing forces/ to meet 
at least two types of eventualities. One is an all-out global war, 
and the other is a limited conflict, perhaps better called an 
aggression with limited aims. In providing for each, we must 
consider our policy--insofar as we are given a choice in any 
particular situation--as to what aggression we will deal with in 
a limited manner, and what aggression against which~ e are 
prepared to unleash our ultimate destructive powero On this 
policy/ rests the initial determination of our balance of forces. 
Such policy decision must be dictated, in view of the enemies' 
superiority in manpower strength, by the area and magnitude of 
conflict/ in which we can maintain an advantage in tactical force/ 
through superior organization, training, equipment and ability of 
the individual soldier. This determination is necessarily subject 
to change, as dictated by the many developments in the cold war 
and technology. 
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It is obviouo that this initial policy decis:io iy'has more 
influence on the size and composition of forces /4esigned to meet 
an aggression of limited aims, than on the for,e designed as a 
deterrent to world conflicto Our deterrent, or retaliatory 
strength--as the case may be--must be sufficient for the purpose 
at all times. In this regard, I do not believe that the members 
of the military establishment /would testify of their belief in 
its sufficiency/ if they did not believe it so. I, also, have 
complete faith in their military ability. It follows that I 
subscribe to the view that the Administration has not requested 
a level of defense forces below the minimum necessary for adequate 
jefense. 
Nevertheless, I do !lQl believe that the Administration 7s 
budget requests for defense /are sufficient. It will not be waste 
to provide a margin of safety against the probability of human 
error, or even the unknown of our enemies' strength, in this area 
on which our very survival depends. There must not be left any 
room for even a shadow of a doubt / in our own minds, and especially 
the minds of our adversaries, that our retaliatory power is 
capable in every circumstance, of complete annihilation of the 
enemy/ if such be necessary. 
There are several areas in which I believe we should expand / 
on the Administration's defense proposals. The first is by 
providing sufficient funds / to insure the ability of the Strategic 
Air Command to maintain/at least / a reasonable portion of its 
force on constant air alert. For so long as we rely on a manned 
bomber force k s an integral part of our retaliatory striking 
power, we must take whatever steps are necessary to insure that an 
enemy's advantage / from the opening blow of war /will not destroy 
our manned bomber force on the ground. The very fact that we 
have planes in the air will have a certain deterrent effect. 
Second, it is my belief that we should move much faster with 
production of second generation missiles. This includes 
inter-continental missiles, the intermediate range polaris 
system, and particularly the anti-missile missiles. I realize 
that the ICBM 9s which we can produce now /may very soon be obsolete. 
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I hope they will. But at each level of development, we must 
provide for t,he interim be.fore we reach the next staga, for our 
intelligence estimates do not tell us when the enemy will strike-­
this being a human factoro If we permit such a thing as ''a time 
before we :· are ready", that will be the day the enemy strikes. 
Our greatest defensive weapon hope lies in the development 
of anti-missile missiles. This weapon is badly needed to balance 
our retaliatory forces, and their perfection should be pushed as 
rapidly as funds can be absorbed into the program. 
Third, we must devote enough resources to our ground forces / 
to enable them to deal effectively with aggression of limited aims, 
or the so-called "brush wars." Once again, the bare minimum is not 
sufficient; and I, for one, am willing to spend the necessary 
money for more and better equipped ground forces. If more of these 
wars of limited areas are to occur--and we must presume that they 
will--we should be prepared to immediately deploy the maximum 
force which can be utilized in the operation, without the delay 
attendant upon a mobilization of reserves. Not only should we 
move at once /4o modernize the arms and equipment of the ground units, 
but we should also provide the means to transport them rapidly/ 
to the areas inwiich they are needed. 
While providing an adquate defense, we must be ever aware 
that the principal hope of the communists, as repeatedly expressed 
in their philosophical treatises and statements of their leaders, 
is for victory without their having fired a shot, or receiving one. 
If we continue our irresponsible fiscal policy, typified by 
increased deficit spending, their hope will surely be fulfilled. 
This, truly, is our greatest danger, for wiile our people, in and 
out of public office, are aware of the danger of armed attack, 
we are not nearly. so unanimous/in our awareness of the threat of 
internal collapse from government spendingfond the resulting 
inflation. 
In ~he last 20 years, the Federal budget has grown to nearly 
seven times its 1939 size. In that same period, we have operated 
the Federal Government within a balanced budget only five years, 
or one-fourth of the time. Last year, fiscal 195f , saw the deficit 
- 5 -
climb to a new pea~e-time high of almost $13 billion. Despite 
the already astronomical size of the debt, this was an addition of 
4.6 per cent. The debt is now approximately $283 billion, and 
even if we were to begin systematically paying it off/at the rate 
of $2,830 million per year, it would take 100 years to complete 
payment, 
The public debt has reached such staggering proportions, 
that the ordinary person finds the figures almost incomprehensible. 
But were an attempt made to collect even last year's deficit, the 
realization would be brought home with an impact ; for to collect 
in one year the $12.e billion we went in the hole in fiscal 19,57, 
would require the confiscation of all personal incomes in excess of 
$4,000. 
One direct result of deficit spending is readily understandable 
to all. That is the pinch of inflation. For example, to maintain 
equal purchasing power, one who earned $2,000 in 1939/4ust now 
earn $4,806. One who earned $5,000 in 1939/ must earn $1) ~604, 
and one whose income in 1939 was $10,000, must now earn $30,971 / 
to maintain indentical purchasing power. 
Not only has deficit spending by the Federal Government been 
responsible for inflation, but the cycle has run the circle, so 
that inflation itself is making further deficit spending /even more 
dangerous than it has been in the past. There is a growing 
reluctance A. o lend money to the Federal Government/at any rate 
of interest. This is well-illustrated by the fact /4hat in the 
Treasury Department's latest debt refinancing attempt, the 
attrition rate has increased to 22 per cent, as compared tO) the 
normal 10 per cent. The obligations which were sought to be 
refinanced/bore interest rates of one and seven-eighths, and two 
and one-half per cent, and the offer was to renew them with 
securities paying three and three-quarters and four per-!cent. No 
realist can doubt, that in the absence of inflation, there would 
have been much less than the normal 10 per cent rejection of the 
offer at these substantially increased rates of interest. This 
illustrates that the rate of inflation is in excess, by far, of 
the prevailing interest rates. Investors and savers have by 
now been thoroughly impressed by the disastrous results of 
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investing in fixea-income securities. The current round of 
Government borrowing was necessitated by the maturity of $9.1 
billion of debt obligations. The sum sought to be borrowed to 
cover the attrition is $1.5 billion. Lest we console ourselves 
with the thought that it could be more, we should remember that 
during this year a total of $42 billion of Government securities 
will fall due. 
It is obvious that as far as borrowing is concerned, we are 
nearing the end of our rope. It will be extremely difficult, 
to continue securing private funds for refinancing the existing 
debt. Even if we manage to hold the debt at its present level, it 
is also evident that unless inflation is checked immediately, the 
Congress will be faced with an increase in the statutory interest 
ceiling, passed in 1918, of four and one-quarter per cent on 
National debt securities. 
There are those who would rely on a hoped-for increase/ in 
our gross national product, and the increased government revenue 
resulting therefrom, to remedy the impasse with which we are faced. 
The same people would hold the line ontaxes and, in some cases, 
increase them. An increase in gross national product will 
und·ewtedly help, and I fervently hope that those who predict 
an eight per cent increase/ will have their prognosis justified. 
As a realist, however, I cannot forget /that the only year in which 
there has been an increase in gross national product of eight 
per centfeas following 1954's 7.5 billion-dollar tax cut. 
Additionally, in all candor, we must admit that a measurement of 
gross national product increase, when measured in dollars, has a , 
built-in inflation factor; 
As much as I would like to see our fiscal problems painlessly 
solved A,y a big increase in national product, to place any reliance 
in what is essentially wishful thinking, would be an expansion · 
of our fiscal irresponsibility. 
To some of you, it may appear, from what I have said, that 
we must choose between providing adequate defense k nd eliminating 
deficit spending. I repeat, they are not inconsistent--both are 
obtainable., We can reduce overall spending drastically/ without 
endangering our defense policy. This is illustrated by the fact 
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that defense spending for 1959/4111 be $4.3 billion lower than 
the 1953 Korean war defense budget, while non-defense expenditures 
for 1959/are estimated at $9.2 billion above the 1953 levelo 
Also, non-defense spending for fiscal 1959A.s to be increased by 
$5.9 billion, against an increase of only $2 billion fordefense 
purposes. 
Spending can be cut without injury to our defense posture / 
by reducing such items, among others, as foreign aid, public 
housing and urban renewal, by declining to enter the fields of 
community facilities and area redevelopment with Federal aid, 
and ·by rejecting any increase in Federal aid to education. Even 
desirable programs should be postponed/until Federal expenditures 
can be reduced well within our income. Special interest groups / 
must not be allowed to sap the strength from our free enterprise 
system, regardless of their attempts to increase their doles/from 
the United States Treasury and the taxpayers' pockets. 
Both the national defense/4nd the curtailment of non-defense 
spending/are matters that must be put above partisan politics, 
for the consequences of failure/are too dreadful t 
consideration except the country's welfare. I can assure 
that Congress is still most responsive to public opinion, and 
our efforts to defend ourselves/from both armed attack and bank­
ruptcy/can only be achievedAf they have the solid support of 
the American public. 
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